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COMMUNITY MATTERS IN CHINA
Jennifer H. Adams

ABSTRACT
In China, a growing awareness that many areas have been left behind during an
era characterized by market reform has raised concerns about the impact of community
disadvantage on schooling. In this paper, I investigate whether villages exert distinct
influences on student achievement. Building on these results, I explore the relationship
between student achievement and resources present in the community. Results indicate
that children who live in communities with higher levels of economic and social
resources have higher mathematics scores, on average.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, researchers have reported a global trend toward the
decentralization of school finance and management by shifting responsibilities from
central governments to local communities and schools. This has raised important
questions about whether differences across communities might be linked with disparities
in children’s schooling (Bray, 1996; Hanson, 2000).
Local governments in many nations have become responsible for the provision
and administration of basic education, and in turn, are expected to raise their own funds,
hire their own teachers, and run local schools (Hanson, 2000; Patrinos and Lakshmanan,
1997; Bray, 1996). In this way, decentralization policies have fashioned community
schools that are even more local—now tied to community economies, leadership, and
social organizations (Cheng, 2001). The increasingly local nature of schooling is
sometimes credited with increasing real national expenditures for education, inspiring
educational innovation, and encouraging community involvement (Tsang, 1996; Bray,
1996; Eskeland and Filmer, 2002). But this praise must be tempered by evidence from
some nations, such as China, that shows concurrent increases in educational inequality
(Tsang, 1996; Tsang, 2003; Park et al, 2003).
In China there is a growing awareness that many areas have been left behind
during an era characterized by market reform, which has raised concerns about the impact
of community disadvantage on schooling (West and Wong, 1995; Ross and Lin, 2002;
Adams, 2001; Adams and Hannum, 2005). In recent years, researchers have linked
community economic indicators to tangible measures of education, such as enrollment
and the provision of schools (Connelly and Zheng, 2003; Adams, 2001; Park et al, 2003;
Hannum, 2003). Evidence has also established a connection between both province and
county-level economic conditions and local investment in education (Park et al, 2003).
Moreover, recent research indicates that both local revenue and community
donations vary across provinces, within provinces, and sometimes even within counties

(Park et al, 2003; Tsang, 2003). While researchers have successfully documented the
extent of variation in community financial resources available for schooling in China,
little is known about whether differences in these economic resources directly influence
student achievement. Moreover, the connection between social conditions in the
community and local schooling is poorly understood.
This paper examines the links between community conditions and student
achievement in one rural interior province in China. In it I address the following
questions: First, after controlling for child background, does student achievement depend
on where the child lives? Second, do children who live in villages with better economic
and social conditions achieve more? If so, does the effect of social conditions differ
depending on the economic resources available in the community?
I begin by describing a framework for understanding the effect of community
conditions on schooling. Next I describe educational reform during the decentralization
era in China, in order to provide a backdrop for a synthesis of studies that have linked
dimensions of communities and educational outcomes in the Chinese context. This is
followed by a presentation of my data and methodological approach, and concludes with
an analysis of the findings.
The results of this study offer additional insights into the linkages between where
children live and their achievement in school. The data provides empirical evidence of
the connection between community conditions and local student achievement and also
the specific dimensions of communities that influence achievement. As educational
policies focused on decentralization intermingle with the financial limitations of an
economy in transition, research that reveals significant geographic inequalities becomes
increasingly important to policymakers in China and abroad who are concerned with
reducing educational inequality and improving the quality of schooling in poor areas.
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The Importance of Place: Understanding the Effect of Communities on Schooling

In the last decade, several researchers have linked the socioeconomic and
structural differences across communities with the individual outcomes of the children
who live in them (Duncan, 1994; Dornbusch et al, 1991; Garner and Raudenbush, 1991).
Even more notable is research that suggests that the influence of communities on
children’s social welfare is separate from family characteristics. For example, Ho and
Willms’ (1996) study of eighth graders in the United States found that parental
participation measured at the school level had a positive effect on student achievement,
net of individual parental participation, indicating that even those children whose parents
did not participate in school activities achieved higher scores when they went to a school
where a greater percentage of community parents were involved. Similarly, using data
from the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), Pong (1998) also found that
strong social networks within a school positively affected mathematics achievement.
Strikingly, one study of adolescent females which used the Panel Study of Income
Dynamic suggested that neighborhood effects on school leaving sometimes rivaled the
influence of family characteristics (Brooks-Gunn et al, 1993).

Research also demonstrates that community economic indicators—such as mean
community income and the percentage of families in poverty—exert distinct effects on
student achievement (Duncan, 1994). In the United States, several researchers found that
the presence of affluent neighbors is a significant predictor of school leaving (BrooksGunn et al, 1993; Clark, 1992). In addition, Dornbusch and colleagues (1991) found that
low neighborhood socioeconomic status has a negative effect on student grades, even
after controlling for individual family background. Similarly, Binder (1999) explains that
average community earnings are a significant predictor of desired schooling in Mexico.
Corman’s (2003) study uses data from four waves of the National Household
Education Survey to provide evidence that community wealth decreases the probability
of grade repetition for U.S. students ages 6-15. Children in richer neighborhoods are less
likely to repeat a grade than children living in poorer neighborhoods. In short, one of the
most clearly established sources of community disadvantage is economic constraints
present in the community.
International studies have documented that schools in many communities are
constrained by local financing (Bray, 1996; Tsang, 1994). In many nations, communities
are required to raise funds for schooling to supplement the inadequate funds provided by
national governments (Bray, 1996). However, faced with a weak tax-base, many local
governments in poor communities are unable to adequately finance their local schools
(Bray, 1996). Accordingly, resource-constrained local schools must rely increasingly
upon local sources of funds generated by community donations, revenue from school
businesses, and student fees (Cheng, 1994; Ross, 1999; Hannum and Park, 2002). Often,
poor communities are unable to pay teacher salaries, provide school supplies, or fund the
costs of basic amenities such as heat and water (Tsang, 1994; Cheng, 1996). In many
countries as the burden of raising school finances falls increasingly on local
communities,, local economic resources are likely to become increasingly important
determinants of local school quality.
In more recent investigations of community effects, primarily in the United
States, scholars have extended their explorations of the role community resources play in
shaping educational advantage and disadvantage beyond issues of local economics to
consider the social contexts in which children learn. For example, Stanton-Salázar and
Dornbusch’s (1995) investigation of Mexican high school students in the San Francisco
area revealed a positive correlation between social networks and academic achievement.
Similarly, in their study of at-risk youth, Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) find that social
capital, broadly defined, is positively associated with socioeconomic success in early
adulthood. Coleman and Hoffer (1987) also credit differences in the social capital of the
communities surrounding schools with the extant existing differences in student
achievement that we observe between public and Catholic schools.
In explaining how the presence of social capital might influence student
performance in school, Coleman (1988) contributed the concept of “intergenerational
closure,” or the relationship of an individual student’s parents with their children’s
friends’ parents. Coleman explains that when parents are in relationships with other
parents, they are more likely to exchange information that may foster children’s
schooling. The following example illustrates how intergenerational closure may operate.
Suppose two students develop a plan to avoid studying for a test: one student tells her
mother she is studying at the other child’s home and vice versa. Instead of studying, the

two students are actually at a third child’s home listening to a new CD. However, if the
children’s parents know each other and communicate regularly, the children’s ruse will
be uncovered quickly— perhaps even in time for their parents to get the children to study
for the test. In this way, intergenerational closure helps parents garner the information
needed to enforce norms and shape expectations about schooling.
The results from empirical examinations linking intergenerational closure with
educational outcomes have been mixed. Consistent with the illustration provided,
Sandefur and Lauman (1998) found that information about their children’s efforts and
successes at school can help parents influence their children to engage with school.
Similarly, using the 1988 NELS data, Carbonaro (1998) found that intergenerational
closure is positively associated with both student math achievement and school retention.
However, a more recent investigation of the 1988 NELS data that treats social capital as a
collective asset indicates that intergenerational closure in public schools is negatively
associated with gains in mathematics achievement when controlling for friendship
density (Morgan and Sørenson, 1999). These researchers argue that it is friendships
between students rather than parents of students that positively influences learning.
Taken as a whole, the existing literature on community effects suggests that the
differences in educational outcomes across communities may arise from various
characteristics and processes operating at the community level. First, local economic
resources influence enrollment, attainment, and achievement. The reviewed research
emphasizes that it is not only the economic resources at home that matter, but also the
average wealth of the surrounding families. Community economic resources may
influence educational outcome by shaping the quality of local schooling. In addition,
community wealth affects the quality of after-school activities available to community
youth—activities that also affect aspirations, effort, and learning. Second, the extent and
quality of community social relationships influence the ways communities shape
expectations, share information, and enforce rules. In this way, communities with more
social resources are more likely to influence student behavior and beliefs both in and out
of the classroom.1
Educational Reform During Decentralization Era China
Nearly two decades of decentralization reforms have made China an informative
case study for investigating the relationship between community resources and schooling.
The shift of financial responsibilities from the central government to local levels was the
foundation of the country’s decentralization reforms in education (Cheng, 1996). Based
on the Decision on the Reform of the Educational Structure in 1985, local governments
were given the responsibility for raising and spending educational revenue. In practice,
the state retained control of curriculum and teacher development, but withdrew its
financial and administrative commitments. This decision was strengthened by several
educational policies published in the 1990s, which reaffirmed the state’s commitment to a
more decentralized system with a more diversified resource base.2 Typically, provincial
governments are now responsible for the provision of higher education, county
governments finance and manage secondary schools, and villages pay for and run
primary schools.

As a result of these policies, local governments were required not only to raise
their own funds for schools, but also to mobilize nongovernmental and community
resources. First, schools were encouraged to set up school-run enterprises, such as
orchards, bakeries, or bicycle repair shops. By 1993, school-run enterprises were
generating 5.4% of the total national expenditure on education (Tsang, 1996). Next,
schools were encouraged to solicit social contributions from local citizens and businesses.
And finally, many schools made up the difference between their revenue and costs by
charging a variety of school fees (Paine, 1998; Bray, 1996; Tsang, 1994). In this way,
decentralization may be responsible for the increasingly local nature of Chinese
schooling, now tied to local economies and social organizations.
Community Resources and Schooling in Rural China
Not surprisingly, scholars who study schooling in China have also discovered
connections between economic resource constraints in the community and educational
disadvantage (World Bank, 1992; Connelly and Zheng, 2003; Adams and Hannum,
2005). Connelly and Zheng (2003) demonstrate that school enrollment is directly linked
to county per capita income. Furthermore, their results indicate that community
circumstances affect enrollment even when family background is taken into account.
Adams’ (2001) examination of children in the early 1990s reveals a positive
relationship not only between village wealth and enrollment, but also between village
wealth and children’s rate of progress through school. Adams and Hannum’s study
(2005) illustrates that village infrastructure is also important in the provision of social
services. Perhaps more telling, children who live in communities where village
enterprises contribute financial resources to schools are always more likely to be enrolled
in school. Although this research empirically links community resources and education in
rural China, it is limited by both an emphasis on enrollment probabilities and a narrow
definition of community conditions.
Few studies have sought to link local economic differences to children’s
experiences once they are in school. Policies that have emphasized both financial
decentralization and the expansion of compulsory education taken together with data
limitations have resulted in research focused on determining whether community effects
only predict enrollment. In recent years, some researchers have widened the scope of
their investigations by exploring the connections between community resources and a
more complex outcome, grade-for-age student attainment (Adams, 2001; Adams and
Hannum, 2005).
Another strand of research focuses on the connection between community
differences and indicators of school quality, such as educational expenditure. For
example, Park, Li, and Wang’s study (2003) of school equity in rural China reveals that
village income per capita is positively associated with both the percentage of qualified
teachers in the village and the percentage of students with desks and chairs. Yet their
research falls short of establishing how these differences across villages affect what
children learn in school. A knowledge gap exists concerning the influence that
communities exert on achievement once children are enrolled in village schools. A more
detailed understanding of the ways in which local community resources affect student

achievement is particularly needed now as school enrollment rates rise in China’s poor
interior and educational policy refocuses on issues of quality.
Even less well established are the particular facets of communities that influence
children’s experiences in school. Previous research in the Chinese context has linked
general indicators of economic development, such as village per capita income or the
presence of electricity to improved educational outcomes (Adams, 2001; Adams and
Hannum, 2005). However, this work is limited by a narrow definition of community that
captures only the most basic economic characteristics in a village and overlooks the
social resources available for cultivating education. Two notable exceptions are the
research of Connelly and Zheng (2003), who constructed a variable to represent
community norms for education, and the qualitative investigations of Ross and Lin
(2002), who reveal the importance of communities’ ability to use social networks to bring
together resources to support local schools.
On this foundation, individuals in some villages may benefit from the existence of
community norms that support education. For example, in some communities pressure to
enforce child labor laws could encourage children to stay in school and work hard rather
than to drop out and seek employment. Connelly and Zheng (2003) found that positive
community norms for education, as measured by the proportion of village children in
school, positively affected educational outcomes for children in the village. Similarly,
some villages have links to social organizations in other communities that they use to
generate both financial and human resources for local schools (Ross and Lin, 2002). For
instance, rural schools that have relationships with schools in more prosperous areas
sometimes “borrow” qualified teachers for a term to improve the skills of local teachers
(Lee and Li, 1994). In this way the strength of social networks—both within and outside
some communities—may contribute to the sharing of information or behavior that
furthers student achievement.
In summary, this study addresses some of the limitations of previous research and
makes several new contributions to understanding the influence of community resources
on schooling in rural China. First, this is the first study of rural China that links
differences across communities with variation in student achievement, rather than
enrollment or attainment. Second, by utilizing village and school-level data, I extend my
analysis beyond basic indicators of village economic level to the actual differences in
school revenue garnered within the village. Third, drawing on social capital theory and
specifically Coleman’s concept of intergenerational closure, I test empirically whether
social relationships in the community matter for student achievement. Each of the above
contributions is possible because of a rich data set collected during the summer of 2000
in rural Gansu Province, China.
DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Data: Gansu Survey of Children and Families
To examine community influences on children’s schooling outcomes in rural
China, I use data from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families (GSCF-1), a multilevel survey of children aged 9-12 , which was conducted during the summer of 2000 in
100 villages in Gansu province. Gansu, located in China’s northwest, embodies the

geographic diversity and poor economic conditions that characterize China’s interior
provinces. Poverty rates are high and economic growth is slow (Gansu Statistics
Yearbook, 2001). Although rural industries have slowly emerged, for the most part
residents are employed in subsistence farming. The average annual per capita income of
rural residents was only 63% of the national average in 2000 (Gansu Statistics Yearbook,
2001). The illiteracy rate, approximately 14%, is more than double the national average
in China (Gansu Statistical Yearbook, 2001).
Most children in Gansu attend primary school in their village. Provincial
educational statistics indicate that nearly 99% of school-aged children are enrolled in
school (Gansu Educational Statistics Yearbook, 2000). However, this figure masks the
numerous children who start school late and drop out early. Many children leave school
because of health problems or financial constraints, only to enroll again another time.
Poor families often lack the resources to pay school fees (Hannum and Park, 2002; Bray
et al, 2004). In addition, persistent poverty negatively affects children’s health and
nutrition, and in turn, their ability to regularly attend and learn in school.3 Moreover, in
some communities, children leave school because of general attitudes towards schooling.
For example, if enrollment rates in a particular community are generally low, families
who do not choose to send their children to school are not considered unusual, and in
turn, are not pressured by other village members to support schooling (Bray et al, 2004).
In this setting, schools also reflect poverty. While most rural villages have a local
primary school, many rural villages lack the capacity to raise the funds required to
adequately fund education. Funds collected locally, including student fees, pay for nearly
all school expenses (Bray et al, 2004). Many teachers in Gansu have little training or
access to professional support. Even more alarming, it is common for teacher wages to be
three months late.
The GSCF-1 examines children’s schooling, achievement, and welfare in the
context of rural poverty by integrating a primary sample of 2000 children with secondary
samples of children’s mothers, homeroom teachers, school principals, and village leaders.
In addition, a teacher questionnaire was administered to all teachers in schools attended
by sample children;providing a sample of more than 1,000 primary school teachers. The
random multi-stage cluster design was employed at each stage draws children from
village lists of school-aged children in selected villages. Achievement tests in
mathematics or Chinese language, designed by specialists at the Gansu Educational
Commission, were administered to all children in the sample. On a random basis, half of
the children were administered the mathematics examination; the remaining half were
administered the Chinese language examination. Different exams were administered to
children in grades 3 and below and to children in grades 4 and above to ensure that the
tests assessed an appropriate range of knowledge.
Analytic Sample
This study used an analytic sample of 436 students in grades 1-3, all of whom
were given the mathematics exam. All of the students also attended school in their own
village.4 This sample was chosen to address both methodological and substantive
concerns. First, I limit the study to the children who were administered the mathematics
exam.5 Within this group of students, some of the students were administered the math

exam for children in grades 1-3, and some were given the exam for grades 4 and above.
Accordingly, I exclude the children in grades 4 and above. Next, in an attempt to find out
more about whether community resources influence schooling at the local village school,
I limited the sample in two additional ways. I excluded villages with more than one
primary school.6 I also restricted the sample to children who attended school in their own
village.7 Children who were enrolled at boarding schools or attended a school in another
village were not included in the sample.
Measurement
This investigation focuses on a subset of questionnaire items that measure
individual level and village level characteristics. The data was collected through
questionnaires administered to the children, their mothers, the village leaders, and also
through village primary school instruments.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all variables included in the analyses.
The student level data consists of controls for the children’s socioeconomic background
and other factors that are hypothesized to affect learning. The village level data includes
variables detailing the economic and social resources in the village, as well as controls
for village population and topography. Table 1 also contains data on student mathematics
achievement.
This paper examines the effect of community on children’s achievement in
mathematics as measured by a test developed by the Gansu Educational Commission.
The test, which was scored on a scale of 0-100, was developed to examine an appropriate
range of the primary school curriculum for students in first, second, and third grades. The
mathematics exam scores in the analytic sample range from 0-99, with an average score
of 42.44. As expected, the average score for second grade students of 29.91 is higher than
the average score for first grade students of 15.54. Similarly, the mean score for third
graders of 59.64 was higher than scores for students in grades one and two.
Child background measures included as controls include a categorical
representative of students’ grades in school and the children’s ages, which range from 713. Because previous research findings reveal that girls may experience more constraints
to schooling in rural China (Hannum, 1998; Zhang, 1998), I also include student gender
(coded 0 if female and 1 if male) as a control predictor. As indicated in Table 1, 49% of
the analytic sample, or 214 students, are female. Family wealth is also included as a
control predictor because of previous research that connects financial resources in the
home to schooling in rural China (Brown and Park, 2003; Adams, 2001). The sample
average value for the log of family wealth is 8.95 with a standard deviation of 0.94.
In addition, I include two predictors to control for children’s opportunity to learn.
The first is the variable, absent, that captures the number of days a child has missed
school during the previous semester. The average number of days absent in the sample is
less than one, indicating that many students do not miss much schooling at all. However,
as suggested by a standard deviation that is more than three times as large as the mean,
there is large variation in days absent across children. For the students who have missed
school during the semester, the number of days absent ranges from 1 to 8. These
absences may limit children’s opportunity to learn, and in turn, influence their

achievement. I also control for the number of books that the family purchased that
semester, as an indicator of support for education in the home. Books in the home can be
regarded as a form of cultural capital in the family. Hannum and Park (2001) found that
the presence of books in the home supports the child’s educational aspirations and
academic confidence.
Table 1 also contains descriptive statistics on the village-level variables selected
to control for the effect of community when estimating differences in student
achievement in mathematics. In this study I control for both village population and
village topography. Finally, the majority of village primary schools do not receive
financing from the government; rather they rely completely on financial resources
collected at the village level. In my analytic sample, 32 schools (less than half) received
some funding from the government.8 I control for the presence of these funds by
including the log of per pupil expenditure from government funds as a predictor in my
analyses. This variable varies widely, ranging from 1-125 yuan.
Most importantly, Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics on two carefully
selected village-level question predictor variables—economic resources and social
resources. Based on research findings that suggest the increasing importance of
community economic resources for local schools (Adams, 2001; Adams and Hannum,
2005; Park et al, 2003; Tsang, 2003), I use the log of per pupil expenditure from
nongovernmental or extrabudgetary resources to represent community economic
resources.9 For example, Park, Li, and Wang’s research (2003) indicates that
extrabudgetary financing increased during the mid- and late-1990s.
To capture the effect of social resources in the community, I draw on the work of
James Coleman (1988, 1991) in creating a variable to represent “community closure.”
Coleman identified the concept of “intergenerational closure,” which can be defined as
the relationship of an individual student’s parents with the parents of their children’s
friends. In the Gansu Survey of Children and Families, mothers were asked if they knew
the parents of their children’s friends. I use the average response of mothers in the village
to this question to capture “the community closure” in the village. This variable ranges
from 0 to 1, with villages that score closer to 0 having less social capital and villages with
scores closer to 1 having more social capital. As displayed in Table 1, the average score
is 0.73. In communities with more social capital, more parents know the parents of their
children’s’ friends, and as a result can garner information about school related matters,
shape and share behavioral norms, and monitor child behavior.
Analytic Strategy
The following analysis presents figures accompanied by regression analyses of
student math achievement. In the first set of fitted regression models presented in this
paper, I use a fixed effects analysis to examine whether there is an overall relationship
between student mathematics achievement and the village in which the student lives, net
of family poverty and other individual characteristics. After controlling for selected child
and family characteristics, I ask whether children who live in some villages in Gansu
have higher mathematics achievement than children who live in other villages, on
average. To conduct this fixed effects analysis, I regress the student mathematics
outcome on a system of 85 dummy variables, V1 thorough V85, representing the 85

different villages in the analytic sample, controlling for individual-level variables. In this
model, each group of children who live in the same village shares a unique intercept
parameter or “village fixed effect.” An examination of the heterogeneity among these
distinct intercepts indicates whether villages differ in students’ mathematics achievement,
on average, controlling for child background. The hypothesized fixed-effects model is as
follows:
MATH ij = β1V1 + K β85V85 + δΖ + ε ij
for the ith student in the jth village. Regression parameters β1 through β85 represent the
main effects of the village fixed effects, and the δ coefficient represents the effect of the
vector of control variable, Ζ, and ε is the usual regression residual. I fit this model to my
data using OLS multiple regression analysis to estimate and test model parameters. I
begin by estimating the model containing only the student-level control predictors. Next,
I estimate a model containing the system of village dummies. I compare models on the
overall goodness of fit, using the R-squared statistic. Additionally, I use a general linear
hypothesis test to test a joint null hypothesis that the regression parameters, β1 through
β85, the village fixed-effects, were simultaneously equal. Rejecting this joint null
hypothesis will indicate that the community where a child lives does affect math
achievement, and consequently sets the stage for a second phase of the analysis in which
I investigate what kind of community characteristics affect the village effects.
In the second set of hypothesized regression models, I explore the effect of
community economic and social resources on student mathematics achievement by
replacing the fixed effects of village by their equivalent random effects, and including
selected predictors that describe the presence of community level resources in a new
taxonomy of fitted regression models. In these analyses I ask, on average, do children
who live in villages with higher levels of economic and social resources have higher math
achievement, controlling for child background? I fit these models using GLS regression
analysis in order to account for the random effects of village now residing in the
residuals. I use GLS regression and a multi-level model because standard OLS regression
analysis does not account naturally for the nesting of the students within village. An
examination of the estimated coefficients associated with each of the community-level
main effects then indicates whether the selected community resources influence
mathematics achievement in Gansu, net of child background. An example of a typical
random effects model is:
MATH ij = γ 00 + γ 01VILPOPj + γ 02VILTOPj + γ 03 LGOVPPE j + γ 04 LNGOVPPE j + γ 05CLOSURE j
+ γ 10 LWEALTH ij + γ 20 AGEij + γ 30 AGESQij + γ 40GENDERij + γ 50 GRADE 2 ij + γ 60 GRADE 3ij
+ γ 70 ABSENTij + γ 80 BOOKS ij + u j + ε ij

where MATH is the math achievement score for the ith child in the jth village. γ00
represents the estimated average math score in the population providing all variables are
centered on their grand mean, γ01, γ02, γ03….are regression parameters representing the
main effects of community level predictors on student achievement, and γ10, γ20, γ30…are

the regression parameters associated with individual level control variables. Residual ε is
the unique error term associated with student i in village j and u is a random effect,
representing the common unobserved characteristics that distinguish village j.
I begin by fitting the model containing the student-level controls. Next, I fit
several models that include predictor variables that represent community economic and
social resources. Models are compared on overall goodness of fit, using the R-squared
statistic. A statistically significant and positive coefficient associated with any of the
community-level variables (γ01, γ02, γ03…) demonstrates that children who live in villages
with higher levels of that particular community characteristic are associated with higher
mathematics scores, on average, taking into account the other community and individual
characteristics in the model.
Then I fit a final model to examine the interaction between village economic
resources and village social resources. A statistically significant coefficient on the
interaction term reveals that the effect of social resources on student mathematics
achievement differs according to the economic resources present in the village. For
example, the effect of social capital may be more pronounced in villages with less
economic resources. Alternatively, the coefficient on the interaction term may not be
significant, indicating that the effect of social and economic resources may be additive.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
The average mathematics exam scores in the analytic sample is 42.44. The scores
vary widely, as suggested by the range from 0-99 and a standard deviation of nearly 28.
Figure 1 provides a schematic plot illustrating variation in average unadjusted village
mathematics scores by grade. Not surprisingly, the figure suggests that average math
scores vary widely across villages even when we take grade into account. For example,
average village mathematic scores range across 83 points for first and second graders,
and 86 points for third graders. An examination of the interquartile ranges for students in
grades one, two, and three also illustrates the extent of the variation in average
mathematics scores across villages. For first graders, the middle 50% of average village
mathematics scores also spread widely, falling between 26 points of each other, from
approximately 3 to 29 points. Among second and third grade students, the interquartile
range is not as large, or approximately 23 points, as among first graders, yet it continues
to demonstrate ample variation in average village mathematics scores.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
In order to determine whether there is an overall relationship between student
mathematics achievement and the village in which the student lives, we now turn to
regression analysis, and examine the fixed effects of villages on student mathematics
achievement.
Examining mathematics achievement across rural villages in Gansu: Does it matter
where a child lives?
Table 2 displays the parameter estimates for a selection of fitted models
predicting the influence of where a child lives on student mathematics achievement,
controlling for child socioeconomic background, days absent from school, and the
number of books purchased that semester.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Model 1 controls only for the individual characteristics of the student. This fitted
model suggests that the only statistically significant student level predictor of math
achievement included in the fitted model represents the student’s grade in school. In
addition, in this model, only 40% of the variation in mathematics achievement is
predicted by the student level characteristics, leaving a substantial portion of the variation
unexplained.
Model 2 presents the results of a fixed effects regression analysis in which student
mathematics achievement is predicted by a system of dummy variables representing
villages, controlling for student background and other individual characteristics. Most of
the student-level control predictors that represent student socioeconomic background
continue to show the same relationship as in fitted Model 1. In addition, however, the
results in Model 2 suggest that student mathematics achievement depends on both school
attendance and books purchased in the last semester. All else being equal, each day a
student was absent in the last semester is associated with a decline of 2.1 points in the
mathematics test score, on average. Like students who usually attend school, children
who have purchased more books in the last semester are likely to have higher
mathematics achievement. Perhaps most importantly, all else being equal, the village in
which a child lives influences his or her mathematics score.
But what is the magnitude of the differences in average mathematics achievement
across villages? After controlling for the effect of student background, I found that the
estimated variance of the estimated village fixed effects is 239.5. However, to provide a
more reliable estimate of the magnitude of these differences, I need to take into account
measurement error in the village-specific fixed effects displayed in Table 2.1.10 After for
controlling for student background and adjusting for measurement error, I found that the
estimated variance of the true village effects is 153.1. Thus, one standard deviation
difference in the true village effects is associated with an estimated difference in student
mathematics achievement of approximately 12 points. These results support my
hypothesis that where a child lives matters, and suggest that differences in village level
characteristics influence student mathematics achievement. In the next section, I
investigate whether economic and social resources in the village affect individual student
achievement.
Do children who live in communities with higher levels of economic and social resources
achieve higher mathematics scores?
In the fitted models presented in Table 3, I replaced the village fixed effects
present in the previous taxonomy of models with their equivalent random effects, and
added selected predictors to represent village characteristics to the regression models. I
continued to control for the individual characteristics of the child and also take into
account the village population, village topography, and per pupil expenditure from
government funds.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In Model 3, I include the log of per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental or
extrabudgetary resources to represent community economic resources. The coefficient on
this variable indicates that students who live in villages that have higher per pupil

expenditures from extrabudgetary, or locally-generated, resources have higher
mathematics scores on average, controlling for student characteristics and other village
characteristics with the exception of village social capital. The coefficient on the log of
per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental funds in Model 5, which controls for village
social capital, is only slightly different from the coefficient in Model 3, indicating that
this measure of village economic resources exerts a distinct influence on student
achievement, and operates separately from the effect of the measure of village social
resources.
Models 4 and 5 display the effect of village social capital as measured by
“community closure.” The coefficient on this variable in Model 4 indicates that on
average, children who live in villages with higher levels of social capital, or where more
mothers know the parents of her child’s friends, children have higher mathematics scores,
controlling for individual and village characteristics. The coefficient on community
closure in Model 5, which also controls for a measure of village economic resources—
namely the log of per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental funds—is nearly identical
to the coefficient on this variable in Model 4, indicating that the effect of village social
capital remains the same even when accounting for village economic resources.
The fitted models presented in Table 3 lead to two important findings. First, on
average, children who live in communities that have a higher per pupil expenditure from
nongovernmental resources have higher mathematics achievement, net of controls.
Similarly, children who live in villages with a higher level of community closure, i.e.,
where more parents know the parents of their children’s friends, have higher mathematics
scores on average. These findings support the hypothesis that differences in economic
and social resources at the community level partially explain the difference across
villages in mathematics achievement.
The specific effects of village economic and social resources can be better
appreciated in Figure 2, which illustrates fitted math achievement as a function of per
pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources and community closure. In this plot,
child background and other village level characteristics remain constant. The figure
shows the estimated mathematics achievement for a female student, age 10, in grade 3,
who has not been absent from school in the last semester, and who purchased the mean
number of books during this period. She lives in a small village in the mountains or
plains and her school, like many village primary schools, does not receive funding from
the state. Village social capital, as measured by community closure, is displayed on the
horizontal axis with a scale of 0 to 1; villages that are closer to 1 have more social capital.
The four sloping lines represent prototypical students in villages at the quartiles for per
pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 shows that there is a positive relationship between village social capital
and math achievement when per pupil expenditure is held constant. All else being equal,
the data shows that villages with more social capital have higher mathematics scores. For
example, in a village with low per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental resources
and low village social capital (0.3), a child could have an estimated math score of 42
points. If the same child lived in a village with average social capital (0.73), her score

would be six points higher, and if she lived in a village with high levels of social capital it
would be even higher.
The prototypical fitted plot in Figure 2 also displays the effect of village
economic resources. When we hold village social capital constant, the gaps between the
sloping lines represent the effect of per pupil expenditure. For example, in a village
where social capital is average (0.73), a child might have an estimated mathematics score
of 48 points, net of other controls, if she lived in a village with low per pupil expenditure
from nongovernmental resources. If the same child lived in the same type of village, but
one with high (top quartile) per pupil expenditure, her estimated mathematics score
would be 59 points, or a difference of 11 points between the poorest and wealthiest
villages.
The effect of village resources is even more striking if we compare the differences
in estimated mathematics achievement between a child who lives in a village with the
highest levels of social and economic resources with a comparable child who lives in a
village with the lowest levels of social and economic resources. The gap in estimated
mathematics achievement is 21 points.
Does the effect of village social capital differ depending on the economic resources
available in the community?
The final question posed in this paper examines whether the effect of village
social capital operates differently on student mathematics achievement depending on the
village economic resources. Model 6 in Table 3 sheds light on this hypothesis by
interacting community closure with the per pupil expenditure from nongovernmental
(i.e., community generated) funds. As displayed in Model 6, the coefficient associated
with the interaction term is not significant, suggesting that the effect of village social
capital, as measured by community closure, was not conditioned by the economic
resources in the village. In other words, village social capital exerted the same effect on
student mathematics achievement regardless of whether the student lived in a village with
more or less economic resources.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Community Matters: Where a Child Lives and the Resources Present
in the Village Influence Student Achievement
The results presented in this paper reveal important new insights regarding the
relationship between communities and schooling in rural China. One of the most striking
findings is that where a child lives definitely affects student achievement. There are large
differences across villages in average mathematics achievement. In addition, these
analyses reveal that the differences in educational outcomes across communities arise, at
least in part, from specific characteristics and processes operating at the village level. In
other words, economic and social resources in the village influence student achievement.
More specifically, children who live in villages with higher per pupil expenditures
from nongovernmental resources have higher mathematics scores, on average, even when
taking individual background and other village characteristics into account. In this way,
the economic resources available to spend on schooling in a particular village may

influence educational outcomes by shaping school quality. This finding resonates with
the concerns expressed by children and parents in rural Gansu during interviews. One
child said that the problem with his school is that it didn’t have any money. He went on
to explain, “Our village doesn’t have any money, so there’s no money to go to the
school.” Villages with more economic resources may have a higher percentage of
qualified teachers working at the village school and a higher percentage of students with
adequate materials for learning. In addition, community economic resources may also
affect the quality of after-school activities available for children in the community and
may, in turn, indirectly shape student aspirations, effort, and attitudes about schooling.
An additional avenue of community influence is social relationships. These
results indicate that net of child background and other village characteristics, children
who were living in communities where a greater number of parents knew the parents of
their children’s friends had higher math scores, on average. It is important to note that it
is probably not the actual friendships between parents that affect student achievement.
Rather, children who live in this kind of community may be advantaged by the support,
guidance, and common values created by these relationships among parents.
This finding also echoes the explanations provided by Gansu parents during
interviews. When parents described their conversations with other parents, they talked
about collaborating on common rules for their children, such as having the children finish
all of their homework before they can play. In addition, they talked about how they
should reprimand village children who didn’t follow these guidelines. One mother
recounted the story of a time when one of her daughter’s friends was not studying well or
paying attention in class. The woman called the young girl to her house and told the child
“to focus on studying and not to play too much…..or she would not test into junior high.”
In this way, social pressure from parents helps to promote behavior that may improve
student achievement in some villages. Interestingly, this study’s results indicate that in
the case of rural China, the effect of village social and economic resources are additive
rather than interactive. Village social capital effects did not vary according to the
economic resources present in the village.
As in many other parts of the world, community matters for children’s schooling
in rural China. This paper demonstrates that village differences in the economic and
social resources available to support local schools have consequences for the students
who live in these communities and attend village schools. The decentralization of school
funding and management has served to create schools that are increasingly local
institutions, reflecting the economic and social resources of the communities they are a
part of. As schools become more local, they also become more diverse, reflecting
different levels of economic resources to draw on, different kinds of physical
infrastructure to facilitate schooling, and different social resources to mobilize. Crosscommunity inequality is linked to the quality of village schools, and ultimately student
achievement.

NOTES
1

Despite the findings described above, the conclusion that communities “matter” is not reached without
difficulty. One frequently argued problem when discussing community effects in the United States is that
people are not randomly assigned to their neighborhood. Instead, similar types of people tend to choose or

self-select into the same communities—the Tiebout process. However, this process of choice is not relevant
in rural China where geographic mobility is extremely restricted.
2

Please see Central Committee of the Community Party, 1993 Education Law (Jiao yu fa) Beijing, (1993);
and Central Committee of the Community Party, 1995 Education Law (Jiao yu fa) Beijing, (1995).
3

For example, many children in Gansu consume low levels of nutrients which affect cognitive
development, such as Vitamin A, iron, and zinc. See Emily Hannum and Albert Park, “Educating China’s
Rural Children in the 21st Century.”
4

This sample size provides me with sufficient statistical power (>.80) to detect small effects at the usual
levels of Type I error (Light, et al, 1991).
5

Previous research indicates that mathematics is more sensitive to differences in school characteristics than
language achievement. See Richard J. Murnane, “The Impact of School Resources on Inner City Children.”
6

For example, some communities have an incomplete primary school, serving children in grades 1-4, and a
complete primary school, enrolling students in grades 1-6. Due to data limitations, I cannot determine how
the village allocates financial resources between these schools. Eight villages were dropped from the
sample because they had more than one village primary school. As a result, 47 children were excluded from
the analytic sample.
7

China has a system of residency laws that require most children to attend schools in their official
residences. However, most children walk to school, and so may attend school in a neighboring village if it
is closer to their home. Similarly, some children attend boarding schools if their homes are so remote that
they are unable to commute to school daily. Due to these circumstances, I excluded 16 children from the
analysis.
8

The variable representing the funds received by village schools from the state (GOV) was missing for
31% of villages. I regressed 15 variables from the village and village school surveys on GOV. These
variables are described in Table A6 in Appendix (6). The R2 statistic from the regression was .97,
indicating that the variables included in the regression explain 97% of the variation in GOV. Given the high
R2 statistic, I decided that using the imputed values would result in estimates that were less biased than
either excluding the cases with missing data or using the mean value of GOV to replace the missing values.
9

The variable representing the funds received by village schools from the villages, social organization,
school’s own revenue, and donations from students, teachers, and officials (NONGOV) was missing for
45.2% of villages. I regressed 27 variables from the village and village school surveys on NONGOV. These
variables are described in Table A7 in Appendix (7). The R2 statistic from the regression was .88,
indicating that the variables included in the regression explain 88% of the variation in NONGOV. Given
the high R2 statistic, I decided that using the imputed values would result in estimates that were less biased
than either excluding the cases with missing data or using the mean value of NONGOV to replace the
missing values.
10

In order to adjust for measurement error and estimate the variance of the true village effects, I fit a
random-effects model, and found that the estimated variance of the true village effects is 153.1. I used a
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test to test the null hypothesis that the variance of the true fixedeffects is zero. The estimated variance of the village fixed-effects is 239.5, which is considerably higher
than the estimated true variance obtained from the random-effects model. Thus, the estimated reliability of
the measurement of the village fixed-effects is 0.64.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for 436 1 , 2 , and 3 Graders in 85 villages in Gansu
Province, China
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

N

OUTCOME VARIABLE
MATH (Grades 1-3)

42.99

(27.92)

436

STUDENT-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES
GRADE 1
GRADE 2
GRADE 3
AGE
AGE-SQUARED
GENDER (FEMALE=0, MALE=1)
LOG FAMILY WEALTH
DAYS ABSENT
BOOKS

0.14
0.38
0.48
10.04
101.77
0.51
8.946
0.32
17.82

(0.34)
(0.49)
(0.50)
(0.95)
(19.48)
(0.50)
(0.901)
(1.04)
(14.95)

436
436
436
436
436
436
436
436
436

VILLAGE-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES
VILLAGE POPULATION
TOPOGRAPHY (HILLY=1)
LOG GOVT PER PUPIL EXP.

1574.62
0.20
1.082

(796.13)
(0.40)
(1.507)

85
85
85

VILLAGE-LEVEL PREDICTOR VARIABLES
LOG NON-GOVT PER PUPIL EXP
VILLAGE SOCIAL CAPITAL (0-1)

1.521
0.73

(1.521)
(0.20)

85
85

FIGURE 1. Variation in Village Mathematic Achievement, Represented by
Village-Specific Intercepts, (nvillage=85, nstudents =436).
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TABLE 2. Regression of Student Mathematics Achievement on Socioeconomic Controls and
Village Fixed Effects (n students=436; n villages=85)
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000

Model 1

Model 2

STUDENT-LEVEL SOCIOECONOMIC CONTROL PREDICTORS
GRADE 2
14.381***
GRADE 3
44.988***
AGE
-20.910
AGE-SQUARED
0.999
GENDER
-0.680
LOG FAMILY WEALTH
1.884
DAYS ABS
-0.569
BOOKS
0.061

17.187***
48.716***
0.848
-0.048
-0.013
1.537
-2.159*
0.158*

VILLAGE FIXED EFFECTS
VILLAGE 1
VILLAGE 2
VILLAGE 3
VILLAGE 4
VILLAGE 5
VILLAGE 6
VILLAGE 7
VILLAGE 8
…………………………….
VILLAGE 78
VILLAGE 79
VILLAGE 80
VILLAGE 81
VILLAGE 82
VILLAGE 83
VILLAGE 84

32.624**
36.283***
33.086**
37.997***
13.127
13.544
11.359
51.378***
18.395
25.007
25.110*
54.984***
46.383***
53.133***
55.739***
2

Goodness of Fit
2

R

~<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001

0.416

R within
2
R between
2
R overall
Test of
equality of
VILLAGE
coefficients

0.545
0.249
0.409
F84,343=4.12***

TABLE 3. Regression of Student Mathematics Achievement on Socioeconomic Controls,
Village Controls, and Village Predictors (n students=436; n villages=85)
Data Source: GSCF-1, 2000

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

STUDENT-LEVEL SOCIOECONOMIC CONTROL VARIABLES
GRADE 2
16.645*** 16.068*** 15.713***
GRADE 3
47.657*** 47.460*** 47.105**
AGE
-8.412
-6.899
-5.615
AGE-SQUARED
0.389
0.310
0.240
GENDER
0.020
-0.020
0.043
LOG FAMILY
1.578
1.568
1.323
WEALTH
DAYS ABS
-1.632~
-1.558~
-1.498~
BOOKS
0.125~
0.126~
0.112~
VILLAGE-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES
L VIL POP
VIL TOP
LGOVPPE

4.167
12.050**

VILLAGE-LEVEL PREDICTOR VARIABLES
LNGOVPPE
COMMUNITY
CLOSURE
INTERACTION
LNGOVPPE*CLOSURE
2
Goodness
R within
of
Fit
2
R
between
2
R overall

4.965~
14.339***
0.996

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

15.745***
46.856***
-6.374
0.296
0.008
1.520

15.347***
46.431***
-4.986
0.222
0.074
1.264

15.419***
46.546***
-4.973
0.220
0.051
1.278

-1.652~
0.122

-1.601~
0.108

-1.630~
0.110~

5.018
12.301***
-0.025

5.827*
14.481***
1.305

5.825*
14.776***
1.320

16.059*

2.895**
16.147*

4.736
19.447*

2.960**

0.544

0.544

0.544

0.544

0.544

-2.366
0.544

0.256

0.326

0.374

0.367

0.415

0.416

0.412

0.444

0.467

0.459

0.481

0.481

~<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 ***p<.001

FIGURE 2 . Fitted Mathematics Achievement as a function of Village School Per
Pupil Expenditure Funded by Nongovernmental Resources and Village Social
Capital for a Prototypical Female Student, age 10, and is in Grade 3*
(n students=436, n villages=85)
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* The student has not been absent from school in the last semester, and purchased the
mean number of books during this period. She lives in a small village in the mountains or
plains and her school, like many village primary schools, does not receive funding from
the state.

